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I. INTRODUCTION
Transnational crime is no longer a topic relegated to James
Bond movies and suspense novels. International narcotic dealings
and money laundering have become a realistic and almost mun-
dane problem for the United States Justice Department. Prosecu-
tors often are faced with the problem of obtaining evidence from
abroad. Smart criminals are making it difficult, if not impossible,
for law enforcement authorities to reach or obtain evidence by hid-
ing it in foreign countries.' Progress has been made in the Euro-
pean sphere through a relatively recent development known as a
mutual legal assistance treaty. This type of treaty seeks to improve
the effectiveness of judicial assistance and to regularize and facili-
tate its rendition. On a bilateral or multilateral basis, countries
hammer out agreements that allow for reciprocal evidence gather-
ing and other functions that could not be accomplished without
the foreign countries' full cooperation.2 The United States has en-
tered into such agreements with Switzerland, the Netherlands, It-
aly, and Turkey. Treaties have been signed with Canada, Colom-
1. See generally Ellis & Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, 19 INT'L LAW. 189 (1985).
2. Id.
3. Shultz, Letter of Submittal, dated July 23, 1987, as printed in the Message from The
President Of The United States, August 4, 1987, U.S. Government Printing Office [hereinaf-
ter Letter of Submittal]. Among the treaties to which the Secretary of State was referring
are: Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters with related notes, May 25, 1973,
United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (hereinafter Swiss Treaty] (en-
tered into force January 23, 1977); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance with the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, June 12, 1981, United States-Netherlands, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No.
10734; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Aug. 20, 1980, United States-Co-
[Vol. 19:3
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
bia, Morocco and Thailand, but these treaties have not yet entered
into force.' The Caribbean Basin, until recently, has remained un-
touched by this transnational phenomenon. Tax specialists and
members of the Justice Department have commented on the need
for similar treaties with other sovereignties such as Panama, Costa
Rica and the Cayman Islands.
The Cayman Islands has proven to be an idyllic location for
tax havens. The Cayman Islands is a British colony, so there is
little, if any, concern about stability.5 Moreover, the Cayman Is-
lands is a well-developed financial center." In addition to the long
tradition of bank secrecy laws, there exist no exchange controls.
7
Another attractive feature is that travel to the Cayman Islands re-
quires only a one hour flight from Miami International Airport.'
The Cayman Islands has established sophisticated communications
networks using telex machines and excellent long distance tele-
phone services.' Advice and counselling can be found in the pleth-
ora of lawyers, accountants, bankers, and trust analysts located in
the Cayman Islands.10 Finally, the Cayman government imposes no
direct taxes. 1 The Cayman Islands has more banks per capita than
any other city in the world. 2 All of these factors contribute to
making the Cayman Islands a superb setting for illicit deals and a
hiding place for dirty money. As one essayist noted, "[i]t is not as
if the Caymans have no laws governing banking institutions ....
[Tihe laws. . . might best be described as 'benevolent' . . . . The
Cayman Government has gone to considerable lengths to protect
banks from prying eyes."'" Due to Switzerland's heightened role in
lombia, Senate Treaty Doc. No. 97-11 (given advice and consent by Senate on Jan. 4, 1982);
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Oct. 17, 1983, United States-Mo-
rocco, Senate Treaty Doc. No. 98-24 (ratified by the President on July 13, 1984); and Treaty
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, March 18, 1985, United States-Canada,
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1092 (1985).
4. Letter of Submittal, supra note 3.
5. Taft, Non-Treaty Tax Haven, 192 N.Y.L.J., July 18, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
6. Weiland, The Use of Offshore Institutions to Facilitate Criminal Activity in the
United States, 16 INT'L LAW. & POL. 1115, 1122 (1984).




11. Id. See further Miller, Why Bankers Love The Cayman Islands, 38 Bus. & Soc'v
REV. 19, 20 (Sum. 1981); Note, Preventing Billions From Being Washed Offshore: A Grow-
ing Approach to Stopping International Drug Trafficking, 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM.
65 (1987).




the cooperation of international investigations, investors and
thieves have been forced to find other places to stash their misap-
propriated funds. Secrecy havens have "sprung up like mushrooms
to meet the needs of a new generation of thieves and drug
merchants."" The Cayman Islands has proven to be a fertile
planting ground.
The United States is continuing in its efforts to combat this
international problem. Talks with Cayman officials produced the
first mutual legal assistance treaty with a jurisdiction in the Carib-
bean. 5 The mutual assistance treaty is a major effort on the part
of the Administration to extend law enforcement throughout the
world in pursuit of drug traffickers, money launderers, and other
criminals."6 The Governor of the Cayman Islands, Peter Lloyd,
stated that the treaty between the United States and the Cayman
Islands is "a sign to the world that the offshore outlaw has no
home in the Cayman Islands."'1 7 The Governor also said that the
government remains committed to safeguarding the "privacy of le-
gitimate financial affairs."1 Critics of the treaty maintain that
"the U.S. has bullied [the Caymans] into the agreement."19 Pub-
licly, United States officials stated that "[the treaty appears to be
part of a new strategy by officials of the islands to develop tourism
and promote growth of their banking and insurance industries."'
However, even a cursory glance at the tourism statistics and finan-
cial reports reveals that the Cayman government needs no help in
boosting its already booming economy.2' The Reagan Administra-
tion has taken a neutral stance by simply characterizing the mu-
tual assistance treaty as "part of a highly successful effort to mod-
ernize the legal tools available to law enforcement authorities in
need of foreign evidence for use in criminal cases."22 Query whose
law enforcement authorities truly benefit from this type of treaty.
14. Weiland, supra note 6, at 1115.
15. Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland
Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
July 3, 1986, read to the Senate Aug. 4, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 536 (1987) [hereinafter Cayman
Treaty].
16. Day, Cayman Islands Gives U.S. Access to Bank Records, Wash. Post, July 4, 1986,
at Fl.
17. Id. at F2, col. 3.
18. Id.
19. Pasztor & Nazario, U.S. Will Gain Access to Bank Records on Cayman Islands
Under New Treaty, Wall St. J., July 3, 1986, at 5, col. 1.
20. Id.
21. I. PAGET-BROWN, COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 6 (2d ed. 1985).
22. Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at v.
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It also should be noted that the treaty is not only aimed at drug
traffickers. A recent Congressional investigation confirmed that the
offshore secrecy havens have attracted doctors, lawyers, tax protes-
ters and others who want to keep their money out of Uncle Sam's
reach.2" It is believed that this pervasive problem has the potential
to undermine the integrity of American banks and other commer-
cial institutions. It also threatens the integrity of the tax system
and deprives the Treasury of badly needed revenue.2 These are
some of the motivating forces behind the United States drive to
enter into a treaty with the Cayman Islands and finally put an end
to the flow of illegal funds into the Caymans.
The goal of this comment is to highlight the provisions of the
United States-Cayman Islands Mutual Assistance Treaty in Crimi-
nal Matters. The Cayman Treaty will be compared with the first
mutual assistance treaty to which the United States became a
party - the Swiss-United States Treaty - in order to give a point
of comparison. The Swiss-United States Treaty is the longest and
most complicated mutual assistance treaty to date. This is partly
due to the complicated banking laws involved and the fact that it
was the first treaty of its type negotiated with the United States. 5
Both treaties try to tackle the same problem of either complying
with or circumventing the long history of bank secrecy laws. One
may attempt to analyze the two treaties by focusing on the parties
involved. Switzerland on one hand is a banking empire, whereas
the Cayman Islands is a small banking center, know more as a va-
cation spot. One may conclude that this characteristic resulted in a
difference in the negotiations of the two treaties; the apparent con-
clusions might be that while the United States persuaded the Cay-
man government to come to the bargaining table and sign such a
treaty, Switzerland held the upper-hand in its negotiations with
the United States. This may be too simplistic a point of view.
Whether or not the United States waived a "big stick" to coerce
the Cayman government to agree to more lenient provisions than
those afforded to the United States by Switzerland is purely con-
jecture. One must not forget that the United States learned a great
deal from the shortcomings of the Swiss Treaty and was not likely
to sign a new treaty riddled with the same errors. Therefore, a
23. Weiland, Congress and the Transnational Crime Problem, 20 INT'L LAW. 1025, 1034
(1986).
24. Id. at 1032.
25. Ellis & Pisani, supra note 1, at 197-98.
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comparison of the two treaties should prove beneficial in order to
appreciate the progress made in negotiating this type of treaty.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS AND THE DISCOVERY
PROCESS
To comprehend fully the effect of this mutual assistance
treaty, it is necessary that one be familiar with the pre-treaty de-
velopment of both the Cayman Islands secrecy law and the United
States discovery process. Banking is one of the Cayman Islands
largest commercial industries and a major source of government
revenue.2 6 The Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Law is the
foundation of Cayman secrecy law and provides, in part: ". . .[N]o
person shall disclose any information relating to any application by
any person under the provisions of this law or to the affairs of a
licensee which he has acquired in the performance of his functions
under the law."2 Thus, one who is under a duty to maintain bank-
ing information and discloses a client's confidential banking infor-
mation is "guilty of an offense and liable on summary conviction to
a fine not exceeding two-thousand Cayman Islands dollars or to a
term of imprisonment not exceeding one year or both." 8 There-
fore, anyone under a duty to maintain that confidentiality cannot
disclose any information that is being sought pursuant to an inves-
tigation without fear of violating Cayman domestic law and being
subjected to its accompanying penalties.
The conflict between the prosecution of persons suspected of
using the tax haven of the Cayman Islands to violate United States
laws and the role of state sovereignty was highlighted in the Fifth
Circuit decision of In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States
v. Field.29 At issue in Field was a Cayman banker's invocation of
his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination at a grand
jury hearing. He exercised this right based on the ground that his
testimony, if given, would violate the Banks and Trust Companies
26. Comment, Piercing Offshore Bank Secrecy Laws Used to Launder Illegal Narcotics
Profits: The Cayman Islands Example, 20 Tax. INT'L L.J. 133, 149 (1985).
27. Id., citing the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Law (Law 8 of 1966). The
Law is reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG. LST
SESS., CRIME AND SECRECY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES 185 (Comm. Print
1983).
28. Comment, supra note 26, at 150.
29. 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 40 (1976).
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Regulation Law.8 0 The Fifth Circuit addressed this problem first
by holding that the fifth amendment did not apply because the
grand jury subpoena was "not an attempt to elicit information
from [the banker] which would later be used against him in a crim-
inal case."'" The court then balanced the respective goals of the
U.S. transnational investigatory procedures, and the Cayman Is-
lands interest in preserving its domestic ability to maintain confi-
dentiality.32 The court noted that any testimony concerning bank-
ing information was a violation of Cayman law, and determined
that the possibility of prosecution by the Cayman authorities was
insufficient to invoke the fifth amendment.38 The court aptly
pointed out that, "[iun a world where commercial transactions are
international in scope, conflicts are inevitable. Yet, this court sim-
ply cannot acquiesce in the proposition that United States criminal
investigations must be thwarted whenever there is conflict with the
interest of other states."'34
Underlying Field is the deeper and perplexing problem of en-
forcing United States extraterritorial discovery procedures. This
30. Id. at 405. The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether fear of prosecution
by a foreign country is sufficient to invoke the fifth amendment. In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d
494 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Sealed Case, a banker from country A invoked his fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination out of fear of criminal prosecution in country B. The banker
was not a target of criminal prosecution in the United States, but a grand jury sought testi-
mony concerning confidential information of his prior customers' accounts and transactions
in country B who were targets of the criminal justice system. The court held that the
banker's fear of prosecution was not "real" because his return to country B would be a
voluntary act, that although he had family there, he no longer lived or worked in country B,
and that therefore he was in contempt for refusing to testify. 825 F.2d at 497. The court
once again balanced the goals of the United States against those of a smaller and less power-
ful country, and created a self-imposed exile upon a citizen obeying the laws of that country,
instead of forcing the prosecuting authorities to seek other means of obtaining the informa-
tion. For further discussion on the fifth amendment privilege and fear of foreign prosecution
see Comment, Sidestepping Foreign Bank Secrecy Laws: No Sanctuary in the Fifth
Amendment and Little in the Interest of Comity, 10 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
31. Field, 532 F.2d at 407.
32. Id. See Comment, supra note 26, at 150. The court used the balancing test set forth
in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 40 (1965).
Section 40 requires states that have jurisdiction to consider: (1) the vital national interests
of each state; (2) the hardship that inconsistent enforcement would place upon the person;
(3) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other
state; (4) the nationality of the person; and (5) the extent to which enforcement can be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state. See also Pisani &
Fogelnost, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, INr'L
CRIM. L. (1987) (an in-depth discussion of the mutual assistance treaties with Switzerland,
Turkey, the Netherlands, and Italy).




Treaty must address problems which arise due to the conflicting
goals of the United States prosecutorial system and the Cayman
Islands and United Kingdom law geared at protecting crucial, yet
confidential, evidence.
The Cayman Islands has become a haven for illegally obtained
funds, regardless of the source." The Cayman Islands has many
laws governing the release of confidential information. The most
widely cited law is the Confidential Relationships (Preservation)
Law (CRP Law). It applies to ". . . all confidential information
with respect to business of a professional nature which arises in or
is brought into the Islands and to all persons coming into posses-
sion of such information at any time thereafter whether they be
within the jurisdiction or thereout."30
This law was tested in United States v. Carver a7 where the
Cayman Court of Appeals overruled the lower court and granted
letters rogatory 5 for the production of documents held by a Cay-
man bank within the jurisdiction of the Cayman Islands.3 9 The
court developed a "two-step procedure by which confidential infor-
mation held by banks [and other nonparties] in the Cayman Is-
lands could be obtained through formal requests for international
judicial assistance. 40 In the first step, the judge must decide
whether the person "can be required to give evidence as to confi-
dential information."' 1 Next, the judge must determine "whether,
to what extent, and subject to what conditions such a person is to
be allowed to give . . . evidence. '42 In Carver, the court then or-
35. Weiland, supra note 6, at 1122.
36. The law concerning confidential information in the Cayman Islands is governed by
the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (Law 16 of 1976) [hereinafter CRP Law],
and the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) (Amendment) Law, 1979 (Law 26 of
1979). Pursuant to these laws, all information in banking records is "confidential informa-
tion" and may not be released by a bank without free and full consent of the holder of the
account or without an Order of the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands. The release of
confidential information without such consent or order subjects the bank officer to criminal
penalties of a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed four years or both.
See Weiland, supra note 6, at 1123-26, and Comment, supra note 25, at 151.
37. Weiland, supra note 6, at 1126; United States v. Carver, No. 5 (Cayman Islands
Civil Appeals 1982) (unpublished), aff'd sub. noma, United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327
(D.C. Cir. 1983). The decision of the Cayman Islands Civil Appeals Court appears in Trans-
national Litigation: Practical Approaches to Conflicts and Accomodations, A.B.A. Div.
PROF. EDUC. NAT'L INST. 1584, 1593 (March 1984) [hereinafter NATIONAL INSTITUTE].
38. For a brief discussion on letters rogatory, see Ellis & Pisani, supra note 1.
39. Carver, NATIONAL INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at 1588-89.
40. Comment, supra note 26, at 155.




dered the witness to appear and produce the requested documents
and further stated that:
S.. [T]he policy of the legislature is that the Confidentiality
Laws of the Cayman Islands should not be used as a blanket
device to encourage or foster criminal activities. There is noth-
ing in the statute to suggest it is the public policy of the Cay-
man Islands to permit a person to launder the proceeds of crime
in the Cayman Islands, secure from detection and punishment."3
Justice Department officials haled this decision as a landmark
ruling for future assistance in United States prosecutions."" How-
ever, it has not relieved the prosecutor or defense attorney of the
necessity of obtaining local Cayman counsel and from proceeding
in the Cayman courts using the expensive and time consuming let-
ters rogatory procedure."8 One commentator noted that the key to
the Carver opinion is the consideration that "confidentiality must
fall in the face of clear criminality."' 8 He further stated that,
"[t]he first important exception (to the general rule pertaining to
judicial assistance) is that it is not enough that proceedings of a
criminal nature should be contemplated in the requesting coun-
tries; they must have actually been instituted."4
Another area of concern which should be alleviated by this
treaty is the problem of dual responsibilities (e.g., those imposed
by United States jurisdiction over a foreign business located within
the United States, and those imposed by Cayman Islands secrecy
laws); Field revisited. The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v.
Bank of Nova Scotia,' (Nova Scotia I) set forth the prevailing
doctrine regarding extraterritorial enforcement of United States
discovery procedures. "9 In Nova Scotia I, a federal grand jury in-
vestigating a customer of the Bahamian branch of the bank for tax
and narcotics violations issued a subpoena duces tecum for records
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also Weiland, supra note 6, at 1126-27 (statement of Assistant Attorney
General Lowell Jensen).
46. Id. at 1127.
47. Id. at 1128.
48. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384
(lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) [hereinafter Nova Scotia I].
49. Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts Regarding the Use of Subpoenas
Duces Tecum to Obtain Discovery in Transnational Litigation: The Search for a Limiting
Principle, 16 INT'L L. & POL. 1135 (1984). To compare the way in which the Seventh Circuit
approached these issues in the United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d
341 (7th Cir. 1983) (question of conflict with Greek law), see id. at 1140-41.
19881
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
and documents held by the bank's main branch or its branch of-
fices."' The subpoena was served on the bank's Miami office and
contained a request for documents located in the Bahamas. The
bank refused to comply claiming that to do so would violate Baha-
mian bank secrecy laws.' The district court found the bank to be
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the United States courts and
ordered the bank to comply with the subpoena. The court simulta-
neously imposed civil contempt sanctions against the Miami of-
fice.5" The bank argued that comity between the two countries pre-
cluded enforcement of the subpoena by use of contempt sanctions
since the bank was subject to conflicting commands of two
sovereigns.5 3
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the bank's argument 4 and
stated that, "[albsent direction from the Legislative and Executive
branches of our federal government, we are not willing to emascu-
late the grand jury process whenever a foreign nation attempts to
block our criminal justice process."' A foreign national may in-
voke the foreign government compulsion defense when a law or
court order of his country bars him from complying with a United
States discovery order.5 6 In order to merit this defense, the court
must find that the subpoenaed party has made a good faith at-
tempt to obtain from his government a waiver of its restrictions."
However, in Nova Scotia I and its progeny this defense has been
restricted, and blocking statutes, designed to prevent the enforce-
ment of United States discovery abroad, have been enacted.58
The bank was served with another grand jury subpoena duces
tecum subsequent to Nova Scotia L This subpoena extended its
reach into the bank's Cayman Islands branch.60 The bank did not
produce the documents and filed a motion to quash. The district
court denied the motion and gave the bank one month to produce
50. Nova Scotia I, supra note 48, at 1386.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1391.
53. Id. at 1389.
54. Id. at 1388-89.
55. Id. at 1391.
56. Note, supra note 49, at 1146.
57. Id. (citing Montship Lines v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
58. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1106 (1985) [hereinafter Nova Scotia III; Comment,
supra note 26, at 158-63.
59. Nova Scotia 11, 740 F.2d at 820.
60. Id. at 821.
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the documents." The bank unsuccessfully petitioned the Grand
Court of the Cayman Islands for permission to reveal the re-
quested confidential information . 2 The bank filed another motion
to quash, which the district court denied and gave the bank seven
days in which to comply.' At a later hearing, the bank produced a
single document. The court found the bank in contempt and as-
sessed a fine of $25,000 per day until the bank complied with the
subpoena.'4 The Eleventh Circuit stayed the fine pending oral ar-
gument.' 5 During the stay, the Governor of the Cayman Islands
authorized the bank to disclose the documents." The Eleventh
Circuit, therefore, remanded the case to the district court. The
bank then produced a "Gentlemen's Agreement" entered into by
the United States and the Cayman Islands which detailed the pro-
cedure to be followed by the United States when requesting confi-
dential information from the Cayman Islands.' 7 The district court
continued to hold that the existence of this agreement was without
consequence to this proceeding, and that the bank failed to act in
good faith. The court assessed a civil contempt fine of $1,825,000
on the bank." On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court's findings," affirming the district court's decision, and
concluding that the "Gentlemen's Agreement" was "nothing more
than a nonbinding diplomatic device to reconcile the conflicts in
jurisdiction . . . and . . . to obtain a more successful political
arrangement. "70
On July 26, 1984, in response to the litigation involving the
the Bank of Nova Scotia, the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Cayman Islands signed and exchanged letters regarding a
procedural mechanism by which the Attorney General of the
United States could obtain documentary evidence from a Cayman






66. Id. The authorization was made pursuant to section 3(2)(b)(iv) of the CRP Law.
See, Comment, supra note 26, at 159 n.185.
67. Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 824. For the text of the Agreement see, Comment,
supra note 26, at 159 n.187.
68. Nova Scotia H, 740 F.2d at 824-30.
69. Id. at 830. See also, Comment, supra note 26, at 162.
70. Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 830.
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information requested would be fourteen days. 71 This agreement
was limited exclusively to matters falling within article 36 of the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.7 2 The effective date of
agreement was August 27, 1984, and it was scheduled to expire fif-
teen months later." Due to the possibility of the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the Cayman Islands negotiating a com-
prehensive treaty, the agreement was extended, first on November
29, 1985, again on May 28, 1986, again on November 26, 1986, and
most recently on May 29, 1987."M
III. A COMPARISON OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES -
CAYMAN ISLANDS TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES - SWISS
TREATY
The problems of obtaining confidential information from an
offshore institution are complex and time consuming. The impor-
tance of the mutual legal assistance treaty between the United
States and the Cayman Islands can be appreciated more fully by
comparing its provisions with those of past treaties, and predicting
its future ramifications. One should examine this treaty to evaluate
whether it has facilitated the process involved in obtaining neces-
sary documents and testimony in the eleven years since Field was
decided.
A. Article 1 - Scope of Assistance
Article 1 provides for mutual assistance in the "investigation,
prosecution, and suppression of criminal offenses."75 The Treaty
71. Comment, supra note 26, at 162. This transaction is known as the Exchange of
Letters Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Cayman Is-
lands and Matters Connected With, Arising From, Related To, or Resulting From Any Nar-
cotic Drugs, as amended by the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs (1961), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1110 (1985).
In spite of the United States concern with procuring necessary information from the
Cayman Islands, one Court of Appeals recently affirmed the quashing of a subpoena duces
tecum. In United States v. Rubin, 836 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1988), the court held that the
quashing of a subpoena duces tecum served on a Cayman banker was proper in light of the
fact that the records sought were those of Cayman Island residents who were neither the
targets of a U.S. criminal proceeding nor subject to the laws of the United States.
72. Comment, supra note 26, at 162.
73. Id. at 163.
74. Telephone interview with Lois Adler, Department of State Legal Affairs Officer
(Nov. 3, 1987).
75. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 1.
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permits cooperation at both investigatory and trial stages; in the
United States this includes grand jury proceedings. The Treaty
also provides for civil and administrative proceedings relating to
narcotic trafficking.76 This Treaty is solely for "government-to-gov-
ernment mutual assistance," therefore no right is created on the
part of private persons to obtain, suppress, or exclude any evi-
dence, or impede the execution of any request.7" Specifically, the
Treaty permits:
(a) taking the testimony or statements of persons; (b) providing
documents, records, and articles of evidence; (c) serving docu-
ments; (d) locating persons; (e) transferring persons in custody
for testimony; (f) executing requests for searches and seizures;
(g) immobilizing criminally obtained assets; (h) assistance in
proceedings related to forfeiture, restitution and collection of
fines; and (i) any other steps deemed appropriate by both Cen-
tral Authorities.7 8
These broad provisions greatly simplify the task of retrieving evi-
dence and testimony located in the foreign jurisdiction.
The United States-Cayman Islands Treaty is simpler and
more comprehensive than the earlier Swiss Treaty. For example,
there is no provision in the Swiss Treaty for executing searches
and seizures. When such a need arises, an ancillary administrative
proceeding must be conducted, and such an agreement needs to be
evidenced by an exchange of diplomatic notes. 9 No such extra step
is needed in the United States-Cayman Islands Treaty. The Swiss
Treaty has a unique provision which allows for compensation to
persons suffering damages resulting from unjustified detention;80
no such compensation is offered by the United States-Cayman Is-
lands Treaty.8 1 In addition, the Swiss Treaty encompasses a princi-
ple known as dual criminality, a concept which is diluted in the
United States-Cayman Islands Treaty. This principle requires that
the offense not only be a crime in the requesting party's jurisdic-
tion, but also be a crime in the requested party's jurisdiction. 2
Those crimes that fall within the scope of the Swiss Treaty are
76. Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at v. See, Ellis & Pisani, supra note 1, at 199.
77. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 1(3).
78. Id. at art. 1(2)a - i.
79. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 1(3).
80. Id. at art. l(1)(c).
81. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4.
82. Id. at art. 18, art. 4(3), and those articles dealing with organized crime.
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listed in a schedule appended to it." In the United States-Cayman
Islands Treaty the crime also must be a crime in the requesting
and requested party's jurisdiction. However, the definitions are so
broad in the Cayman Treaty that it is difficult to conceive of a
crime that is not within this provision, except those crimes that are
explicitly excluded by the Treaty."
B. Article 2 - Central Authorities
The Central Authority in each state is "responsible for trans-
mitting, receiving and handling requests under the treaty on behalf
of Federal and State Agencies." ' The Central Authority for the
United States shall be the Attorney General or a person designated
by him." The Central Authority for the Cayman Islands shall be
the Cayman Mutual Legal Assistance Authority or a person desig-
nated by it.87 All requests under this Treaty shall be made by the
Central Authority of the requesting party to the Central Authority
of the requested party.8
The Swiss Treaty procedure is identical."' It has been said
that "one of the main reasons for the success of the treaty is that
Article 28 sets up a central clearinghouse for Treaty requests in
each country's Department of Justice, and . . . provides for direct
communication between the two Justice Departments.""0 This
principle was copied in the United States-Cayman Islands Treaty
and enables the countries to address the other's request without
creating unnecessary red tape.
C. Article 3 - Limitations on Assistance
Article 3 specifically excludes from the Cayman Treaty's
scope:
any matter which relates directly or indirectly to the regulation,
including the imposition, calculation, and collection, of taxes;
83. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 1.
84. Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at v.
85. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 2(2).
86. Id.
87. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 2(3).
88. Id.
89. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 28.
90. Chamblee, International Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases in I TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION: PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS AND ACCoMMODATIONS, 188, 226 (1984).
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except for any matter falling within Article 19 subparagraphs
3(d) and 3(e) which deals with willfully or dishonestly obtaining
money, property, or valuable securities by false pretenses and
willfully or dishonestly making false statements to government
tax authorities with respect to tax matters arising from unlawful
proceeds; or any conduct not punishable by imprisonment of
more than one year.9 '
The Treaty also permits a party to deny assistance if the re-
quest does not conform with the Treaty. Assistance also is denied
where the request relates to a political offense or to an offense
under military law which would not be an offense under ordinary
criminal law.' 2 Assistance may be barred if the request fails to es-
tablish "reasonable grounds," i.e., a precise, rational explanation
for believing that the requested information is in the territory of
the requested party. Assistance also may be barred if the request is
contrary to the requested party's public interest.' The phrase
"public interest" is to be construed narrowly." Therefore, the par-
ties cannot refuse to execute a request on some ambiguous or ca-
pricious policy rationale. In addition, the Treaty has alternate ave-
nues of approach to save a request, rather than simply disposing of
it, if it encounters one of the above-mentioned barriers. The two
parties must determine whether the assistance can be given and, if
given, subject to what conditions.9 5 If the two parties agree to cer-
tain conditions, the requesting party must abide by those condi-
tions. In essence, the Treaty is broadly defined as to scope, but
several technical requirements must be met and some areas are ex-
cluded completely.
The Swiss Treaty excludes similar areas from its scope; for ex-
ample, investigations or proceedings dealing with political offenses,
and military obligations which are not punishable under ordinary
criminal statutes.6 The Swiss Treaty also excludes the extraditions
or arrests of persons convicted of committing a crime and those
proceedings which deal with cartel or anti-trust laws. 7 These ex-
clusions, however, are subject to some exceptions. 8
91. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 3(1)a and b, and art. 19(3) and e.
92. Id. at art. 3(2)a, b and c.
93. Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at vi.
94. Id.
95. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 3(4).
96. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 2(1)c.
97. Id. at art. 2(1)a, b, and c(4).
98. Id. at art. 2(2).
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D. Article 4 - Form and Contents of Requests
The requesting party is to follow the form and contents of the
procedure agreed upon by the Central Authorities." The requests
shall be submitted in writing and shall contain:
(a) the name of the authority conducting the investigation ...
(b) the subject matter and nature of the investigation . . .; (c)
information concerning the persons involved . . .; (d) the infor-
mation relied upon in support of the request ... ; (e) a descrip-
tion of the evidence, information or other assistance sought...;
(f) the purpose for which the evidence or information or other
assistance is sought; and (g) the identity and presumed location,
where known, of any person from whom evidence is sought.' 0
The request should be specific and informative so that the re-
quested party can quickly and efficiently respond. The requesting
party is urged to find out all it can from all available sources
before soliciting the help of the requested party. If possible, the
request shall contain other helpful information "to the extent nec-
essary and possible."'0 1 The Swiss Treaty has an almost identical
provision." 2
E. Article 5 - Execution of Requests
The Central Authority of the requested party, according to
Article 5, is obligated to do everything in its power to execute the
request promptly. 08 The courts of the requested party shall have
99. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 4(1).
100. Id. at art. 4(2) a-g.
101. Art. 4(3) of the Cayman Treaty reads:
To the extent necessary and possible, a request shall also include: (a) the
identity and location of a person to be served, that person's relationship to the
proceedings, and the manner in which service is to be made; (b) available infor-
mation on the identity and the whereabouts of a person to be located; (c) a
precise description of the place or person to be served and of the articles to be
seized; (d) a description of the manner in which any testimony or statement is to
be taken and recorded; (e) a list of questions to be asked of a witness; (f) a
description of any particular procedure to be followed in executing the request;
(g) information as to the allowances and expenses to which a person asked to
appear in the territory of the Requesting Party will be entitled; and (h) any
other information which may be brought to the attention of the Requested Party
to facilitate its execution of the request.
Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 4(3).
102. Swiss Treaty, supra, note 3, at art. 29.
103. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 5(1).
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jurisdiction to issue subpoenas, search warrants, or other orders
necessary to execute the request.'" Such necessary administrative
or judicial action is to be arranged without cost to the requesting
party."°5 This provision is particularly useful in the area of interna-
tional legal cooperation where the cost of retaining counsel abroad
to present and process letters rogatory can be prohibitive.100 The
request is to be executed in accordance with the laws of the re-
quested party. If allowed under the laws of the requested party or
the Treaty, the requested party will execute the request using the
method specified by the requesting party. This is provided for
"since those methods may be designed by the requesting party to
ensure the admissibility of the evidence collected at trial in its
country or enhance the utility of the evidence for specific purposes
(e.g., to improve the scientific accuracy of forensic tests)."10 7 The
article also provides for the postponement of the execution of re-
quests if the execution would interfere with an ongoing criminal
investigation within the requested party's jurisdiction.' The Cen-
tral Authority of the requested party shall promptly inform the
Central Authority of the requesting party of a denied request or if
the request can be carried out only by complying with certain con-
ditions.1 09 If the request must be denied completely, the Central
Authority of the requested party shall inform the Central Author-
ity of the requesting party the reasons for the denial.1 '
The Swiss Treaty provides for the same type of due diligence
effort to comply with the requesting party's request.1 ' In contrast,
the Swiss Treaty makes no mention of special conditions that
might be implemented to save a fatally defective request. Nor does
the Swiss Treaty require that an explanation be given for the re-
fusal to execute a request. By including these extra requirements,
the United States-Cayman Islands Treaty offers the requesting
party a better chance of obtaining some type of cooperation even if
the request is flawed. The requesting party also is provided with
information of why the request was denied to prevent the same
mistakes from being made in the future.
104. Id.
105. Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at vi.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 5(4).
109. Id. at art. 5(4) and 5(5).
110. Id. at art. 5(5).
111. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 9.
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F. Article 6 - Costs
In general, Article 6 requires that the requested party render
assistance without cost to the requesting party unless the Treaty
specifically calls for reimbursement. Those costs subject to reim-
bursement include travel expenses of witnesses, fees of expert wit-
nesses, fees of counsel, costs of stenographic reports (if not pre-
pared by a salaried government employee) and reasonable costs of
interpreters or translators.11 The Swiss Treaty provides for reim-
bursement for similar expenditures.11 s There is one significant dif-
ference. The Cayman Islands Treaty requires reimbursement for
the reasonable cost of providing those documents or records speci-
fied in a request. ' Such costs include those incurred when a
United States court issues a subpoena for bank or business
records." Since this treaty primarily is aimed at catching those
persons who hide their money in the Cayman Islands, it would be a
very expensive, one-sided burden on the Caymans to assume the
cost of providing bank records. The expenses paid for witnesses
should be commensurate with those ordinarily paid in the request-
ing party's territory, but this provision does not prevent the re-
questing party from exceeding this base level.1 6 A requesting party
also may provide a witness with money for an attorney."7
G. Article 7 - Limitations on Use
As with most mutual legal assistance treaties, the Cayman Is-
lands Treaty provides that evidence obtained from the requested
party be used only for the purposes stated in the request unless
prior consent is given by the requested party." 8 All evidence
should be kept confidential unless otherwise agreed by the Central
Authorities. 9 The Cayman Islands Treaty is very sensitive to the
issue of confidentiality. This concern is consistent with the tradi-
tion of bank secrecy and sensitivity to the privacy of financial mat-
ters. Just as the disclosed information is to be kept confidential, so
112. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 6(1)a-c, e, f.
113. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 34(1).
114. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 6(d).
115. Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at vii.
116. Id. at vii.
117. Id.
118. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 7(1); Ellis & Pisani, supra note 1, at 208.
119. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 7(2).
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too are the requested party's efforts to obtain such evidence. 10 If
the requested party can comply with the request only by destroy-
ing confidentiality, it shall inform the requesting party of the situ-
ation before proceeding." 1 After the evidence is made public (e.g.,
at trial) the Treaty places additional restrictions on the future use
of that evidence121 in procedures which include, "inquiries, exami-
nations, audits, efforts to identify targets, or use in any prosecution
or proceeding other than that for which assistance was granted.'1
23
This provision, in effect, ensures fair dealing between the parties
and curtails abuse of the Treaty.
Article 5 of the Swiss Treaty contains similar limitations deal-
ing with the use of information obtained under the provisions of
the Treaty. Article 5 echos a principle common to extradition trea-
ties, known as the rule of speciality. In keeping with this principle,
the assistance granted under the treaty is exclusively for the pur-
poses stated in the request.'24 This rule has been maintained in the
United States-Cayman Islands Treaty. The rule promotes the no-
tion of fair play by providing for full cooperation to the extent
agreed upon, and by prohibiting the use of such evidence for pur-
poses beyond the scope of the Treaty.
120. Id. at art. 7(3).
121. Id.
122. Art. 7(4) reads:
Except as may be permitted under paragraph 1, any information of evidence
obtained under this Treaty which has been made public in the territory of the
Requesting Party in a proceeding forming part of the prosecution of a criminal
offense described in the request may be used only for the following additional
purposes:
(a) where a trial results in a conviction for any criminal offense within
the scope of this Treaty, for any purpose against the person(s) convicted;
(b) whether or not a trial results in a conviction of any person, in the
prosecution of any person for any criminal offense within the scope of this
Treaty; and
(c) in civil or administrative proceedings, only if and to the extent
that such proceedings relate to:
(i) the recovery of the unlawful proceeds of a criminal offense within
the scope of this Treaty from a person who has knowingly received them;
(ii) the collection of tax or enforcement of tax penalties resulting
from the knowing receipt of the unlawful proceeds of a criminal offense
within the scope of this Treaty; or
(iii) the recovery in rem of the unlawful proceeds or instrumentalities
of a criminal offense within the scope of this Treaty.
Cayman Treaty supra note 15, at art. 7(4).
123. Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at vii.
124. Chamblee, supra note 90, at 224.
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H. Article 8 - Taking Testimony and Producing Evidence in
the Territory of the Requested Party
Article 8 of the United States-Cayman Islands Treaty provides
that a person who is to testify or produce articles of evidence
within the territory of the requested party may be so compelled by
the laws of that party. 2 5 Even if the person claims immunity or
privilege from testifying under the laws of the requesting party,
the evidence nonetheless will be taken. The claim or protest will be
made known to the requesting party for its determination. 2 ' This
is a major break from the standard set by the Swiss Treaty. Article
10 of the Swiss Treaty states that a "person may not be so com-
pelled if under the law of either State he has a right to refuse."' 27
The Swiss provision might be problematic because of a lack of
available authority competent to judge whether that person does
indeed have a valid right to refuse under the law of the foreign
jurisdiction. No such problem exists under the Cayman Islands
Treaty. In addition, the Swiss Treaty is very exact regarding when
bank records and business records may be disclosed."28 The Cay-
man Treaty is not as specific in dealing with the disclosure of bank
and business records.
Article 8 of the Cayman Islands Treaty also provides that in-
terested parties may be present during the taking of evidence.' 9
Included within the definition of interested parties is the attorney
of the witness involved. All documentary evidence gathered shall
be authenticated by a form which is appended to the Treaty. 30
This form is consistent with the evidentiary requirements under
United States law.
L Article 9 - Providing Records of Government Agencies
Article 9 permits the requested party to provide to the requesting
party authenticated, publicly-available government department
and agency records."' If such documents are not publicly availa-
ble, they shall be furnished in the same manner as they would be
125. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 8(1).
126. Id. at art. 8(2).
127. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 10(1).
128. Id. at art. 10(2).
129. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 8(4).
130. Id. at art. 8(5); Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at vii.
131. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 9(1) & (3).
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to the law enforcement agencies and judiciary of the requesting
party. 1 8 2 According to one commentary, in order to determine
whether files are publicly available, the United States Freedom of
Information Act should be a helpful guide; however, a record
would not be deemed available to the public solely because it is
available under this statute. 88 Therefore, not all records can be
obtained by the requesting party. The method used in authenticat-
ing these documents conforms with United States law as it is em-
bodied in Rule 902(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence."" The
Swiss Treaty requirements differ from those in the Cayman Is-
lands Treaty only in that they are more arduous." 5
J. Article 10 - Appearance in the Territory of the Request-
ing Party
Article 10 enables the requested party to invite a witness to
give testimony in the territory of the requesting party. The witness
cannot be compelled to be present in the jurisdiction of the re-
questing party.186 The witness' expenses shall be absorbed by the
requesting party. 87 A witness who complies with the invitation is
immune from service of process while within the territory of the
requesting party. He also is protected from any infringement on
his freedom based on any conduct committed in either territory
prior to the date of departure." 8 This "safe conduct," which acts
essentially as a shield against prosecution for previous crimes com-
mitted in the territory, ceases ten days after proper notice is given
to the witness by the appropriate authority, or if that witness
leaves the territory and then voluntarily reenters.'39 The Treaty
makes reference only to those crimes committed before departure,
not those crimes committed while present in the requesting party's
territory. Therefore, crimes such as perjury committed during the
giving of testimony can be prosecuted without violating the safe
conduct provision."" The Swiss Treaty contains similar
132. Id. at art. 9(2).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976); Ellis & Pisani, supra note 1, at 203, 204.
134. Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at vii.
135. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 16(1), 18, 19, 20.
136. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 10(1).
137. Id. at art. 6(2).
138. Id. at art. 10(2).
139. Id. at art. 10(3).




K. Article 11 - Transferring Persons in Custody for Testi-
monial Purposes
Both the Cayman Treaty and the Swiss Treaty provide for the
transfer of persons in the custody of the requested state to the re-
questing state to testify, provided that: 1) the person in custody
consents; and 2) the requested party consents.142 The Swiss Treaty
provides further that the transferee be allowed to use the laws of
the requesting state to assure that his . . . custody or return is
consistent with the constitution of that state.14 3 Both treaties are
consistent to the extent that the person in custody and the Central
Authority must consent to the transfer, but the Swiss Treaty adds
the proviso that "no substantial extension of. . . custody is antici-
pated."""' Both treaties provide for the safe conduct and health of
the transferee.1 4 5 The Cayman Treaty also makes reference to
credit for time served if the transferee consents to the request to
testify in the requesting state.1 "6
Article 11 enhances the underlying policy of the Cayman
Treaty of expediting the prosecutorial efforts of the United States
while preserving the sovereign integrity of the Cayman Islands.
Persons in the custody of Cayman authorities could provide
needed information in a variety of cases, but their constitutional
rights will not be jeopardized by the thwarting of due process
requirements.
L. Article 12 - Location of Persons
Both the Cayman Treaty and the Swiss Treaty provide for as-
sistance in locating persons needed for the investigation, prosecu-
tion, or suppression of a criminal activity within the requesting
state.1 , 7 This provision is standardized in most mutual assistance
treaties. It requires that the requested party take all necessary
steps to locate or identify persons, such as witnesses, who are be-
141. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 23 and 27.
142. Id. at art. 26(2)(a),(c); Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 11(1).
143. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 26(4).
144. Id. at art. 26(2)(b).
145. Id. at art. 27; Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 11(3)(a).
146. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 11(3)(c).
147. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 11; Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 12(1).
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lieved to be within its territory,' regardless of the availability of
compulsory measures. 149 This provision strengthens the coopera-
tive spirit of the mutual assistance treaty by providing a mecha-
nism to locate needed individuals without becoming entangled in
the complexities of a foreign legal system.
M. Article 13 - Service of Documents
The requested party shall furnish any document relating to or
forming part of any request for assistance which has been properly
made under the provisions of the Cayman Treaty and the Swiss
Treaty.' The Swiss provision relates to procedural documents,
whereas the Cayman provision speaks only of documents. Proce-
dural documents do not include arrest warrants, but do include
subpoenas and summonses.' 9 ' The Swiss Treaty makes an excep-
tion to the requirement that a requested party personally serve a
document, other than on a national of the requesting state, if the
person served is a defendant in a criminal proceeding to which the
request relates.152 The Swiss considered this provision to be re-
quired by their law and policy, and it has no applicability to extra-
dition or arrests. 53 The Cayman Treaty excludes the service of any
subpoena or other process on any person requested to testify
before a tribunal in the requesting state.1 54 These provisions are
not limitations on Section 1783 of the United States Code, which
authorizes the issuance of subpoenas in criminal proceedings to
United States citizens who are in a foreign country.""
N. Article 14 - Search and Seizure
Both the Cayman Treaty and the Swiss Treaty permit search
and seizure at the request of the requesting party.'" The request
148. Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at vii.
149. Technical Analysis of the Treaty Between the United States and Switzerland on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters signed May 25, 1973, reprinted in Message From
The President Of The United States dated February 18, 1976 at 49 [hereinafter Technical
Analysis].
150. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 22, Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 13.
151. Technical Analysis, supra note 149, at 57.
152. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 22(2).
153. Technical Analysis, supra note 149, at 57.
154. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 13(1).
155. Technical Analysis, supra note 149, at 57.
156. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 14. See Ellis & Pisani, supra note 1, at 204
n.85 (stating that this is implied in the Swiss Treaty in article 31(2)).
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must contain enough information to justify a search and seizure
under the laws of the requested party.' One commentator noted
that a request from one country to the United States would have
to be supported by a showing of probable cause, and corresponding
compliance with other country's evidentiary standards.158 The Cay-
man Treaty allows an exception to the U.S. hearsay rule. It allows
evidence seized to be admitted without additional proof of chain of
custody, if every official who has had custody of the seized article
certifies the continuity of custody, identity, and integrity of its
condition.""' The Swiss Treaty provision dealing with search and
seizure is patterned after Rule 902(3) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.'ie
0. Article 16 - Proceeds of Crime
The subject matter of article 16 of the Cayman Treaty is not
found in its Swiss counterpart. This article provides assistance
with the forfeiture or restitution of proceeds of a criminal offense
as defined in the Treaty. The collection of fines imposed as a sen-
tence for a criminal offense also is covered by this provision.'61 The
definition of proceeds includes, but is not limited to, money, valua-
ble assets used in the perpetration of a criminal offense, and valua-
ble assets obtained as a benefit of a crime.16 2 A temporary re-
straining order may be issued until an action for the recovery of
assets can be commenced.
16 3
This provision allows for "assistance in an area in which coun-
tries do not necessarily otherwise assist each other in the execution
of their penal laws."'"' This article is consistent with laws which
provide for the equitable sharing of forfeited property with a for-
eign government involved in a narcotics investigation.6 5 In this
treaty, proceeds cover a greater variety of criminal offenses than
157. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 14.
158. Ellis & Pisani, supra note 1, at 204. See Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art.
14(1); Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at viii.
159. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 14(2); Ellis & Pisani, supra note 3, at 204.
This Note will not discuss Cayman Treaty article 15 and its corollary, Swiss Treaty article
35, which provide for the return of any items furnished by the requested party.
160. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 18(4), 20.
161. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 16(2)c.






prior mutual assistance treaties.'"'
P. Article 17 - Exclusivity
Both treaties permit the use of other relevant international
agreements or arrangements which may offer alternative means of
securing assistance. 6 7 However, under both treaties, if the assis-
tance falls squarely within the treaty's provisions, the parties must
follow the treaty's procedures for obtaining the needed informa-
tion.1"8 The Cayman Treaty provides that any compulsory mea-
sures, including a grand jury subpoena for the production of docu-
ments in the requested territory, must first comply with the
procedures set out in the Treaty before they will be enforced."6 '
This provision "addresses a particular Cayman and British concern
for respecting Cayman's bank secrecy laws. '1 7 0 A notice from the
requesting party that a denial of the enforcement will jeopardize a
successful investigation or prosecution, marks the commencement
of a ninety-day period within which any enforcement request must
be fulfilled."' This provision seems to favor prosecutorial efforts
and weighs against Cayman sovereignty.
Article 17 does not cover administrative summonses, such as
those from the Internal Revenue Service or the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, provided the matter under investigation is not
a criminal offense as defined by article 19 of the Cayman Treaty." 2
Article 17 does not limit the right to serve a subpoena or warrant
on one who is within the jurisdiction of the United States, even
though disclosure may be protected by Cayman secrecy laws.1
7 3
The Swiss Treaty is more detailed than the Cayman Treaty
with regard to the applicability of international agreements and
the role of municipal laws in either country. The Swiss Treaty pro-
vides that either the United States or Switzerland may conduct
166. Compare art. 19 of the Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 19 with Schedule of Offenses
and arts. 6-8 of the Swiss Treaty, supra note 3.
167. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 38; Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 17;
Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at ix ("arrangements" include but are not limited to such
international organizations as Interpol).
168. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 17(2); Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art.
38(1).
169. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 17(3), (4).
170. Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at ix.
171. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 17(4).




investigations and proceedings in criminal matters in accordance
with its own municipal laws. Therefore, alternative means that
otherwise become available outside the guidance of the treaty are
not limiting.174 However, the rule that the treaty shall take prece-
dence over any inconsistent provisions of the municipal laws in ei-
ther country is dominant. 7  The 1951 Income Tax Convention be-
tween the United States and Switzerland governs exclusively in
income tax investigations, unless the investigation relates specifi-
cally to organized crime.
1 7
1
Q. Article 18 - Consultations
At mutually agreed upon times, the Central Authorities will
meet to keep each other informed as to the status and disposition
of the evidence obtained under the respective treaties. 17 The Swiss
Treaty is more comprehensive and complex with regard to the pro-
cess of dispute resolution or interpretation of the treaty and its
application. Under the Swiss Treaty, if the Central Authorities
cannot resolve these difficulties by mutual agreement, then the dis-
pute shall be submitted to an arbitral tribunal of three members
upon request. 78 Each Central Authority shall appoint one arbitra-
tor, who together shall appoint a third neutral arbitrator to act as
chairman . 7 If either Central Authority fails to appoint its arbitra-
tor within three months of the request, the President of the Inter-
national Court of Justice shall select the arbitrator. If the chair-
man is not chosen within two months he will be selected in the
same manner. °80 The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on
both parties.181
The Cayman Treaty, in contrast, is much simpler and requires
only that the difficulty be resolved by way of consultation. Diplo-
matic and political branches therefore can lend assistance and by-
174. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 38; Technical Assistance supra note 149, at 64.
175. Id. However, Swiss Treaty art. 38(3) provides for the limited exception regarding
economic espionage and bank secrecy. See Articles 3 and 10 for further detail.
176. Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, 2
U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316. See Technical Analysis, supra note 149, at 64.
177. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 18(1); Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art.
39(1).
178. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 39(2).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 39(3).
181. Id. at 39(7).
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pass the arbitration process.""2
R. Article 19 - Definitions
This provision delineates all those offenses which fall within
the scope of the Treaty. If a request is made pursuant to an inves-
tigation for a criminal act that is not included in article 19, then
the request cannot be granted. 83 The Cayman Treaty includes
criminal offenses which are punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year, as defined by the laws of both the United States
and the Cayman Islands. These criminal offenses include racke-
teering, drug trafficking, failing to report transfers of illegally ac-
quired money, fraud in connection with tax shelters, tax evasion,
insider trading, and violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. Any crime that is deemed appropriate may be added to this
article in the future.'" The Swiss Treaty contains a schedule of
offenses for which compulsory measures provided under the Treaty
are available.185 The Swiss Treaty schedule is very specific and de-
tailed as to the type of crime that falls within the provisions of the
Treaty and leaves little room for creative manipulation or interpre-
tation compared with the Cayman Treaty.'" e
IV. THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM OF INSIDER TRADING
In article 19(3)g, the Cayman Treaty defines insider trading as
"[t]he offer, purchase, or sale of securities by any person while in
possession of material non-public information directly or indirectly
relating to the securities offered, purchased, or sold, in breach of a
legally binding duty of trust or confidence. 1 8 7 The significance of
this single provision can only be appreciated by reviewing the his-
tory of United States-Swiss insider trading problems; the Swiss
182. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 18(2).
183. Id. at arts. 1, 3, and 4.
184. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 19(3); Letter of Submittal, supra note 3, at
ix-x.
185. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at Schedule of Offenses.
186. Compare id. with Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 19.
187. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 19(3)g. For the specific offenses listed under
the Cayman Treaty see the full text of art. 19. See also Klock, A Comparative Analysis of
Recent Accords which Facilitate Transnational SEC Investigations of Insider Trading, 11
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 243, for a brief discussion concerning insider trading and Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, Japan, the Cayman Islands, and Canada, including a reproduced
copy of the Cayman Treaty.
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Treaty does not contain a provision similar to that in the Cayman
Treaty.
On August 31, 1982, the United States and Switzerland signed
a Memorandum of Understanding. This Memorandum detailed the
method by which violators of U.S. securities laws could be pur-
sued.188 Insider trading occurs when those with material, nonpublic
information trade on the basis of that information. 8" Swiss banks
are authorized and permitted to trade on behalf of their customers.
Bank records which might reveal trading activity are protected
under Swiss bank secrecy laws; therefore, bank customers are shel-
tered from possible prosecution for insider trading.190 Swiss bank
secrecy laws also forbid the disclosure of the names of customers
whose accounts have been involved in bank transactions.191 Over
the past six years, the Swiss have traded over $8.5 billion of equity
and $337 million in corporate bonds annually. These transactions
have created opportunities for market abuse. 192 A detailed analysis
of Swiss insider trading is beyond the scope of this comment; how-
ever, a brief procedural history is helpful.
The Memorandum of Understanding between the United
States and Switzerland had two functions. First, it reaffirmed the
commitment between the United States and Switzerland to use
and exchange opinions clarifying the availability of assistance
under the Swiss Treaty; second, it outlined an agreement among
the members of the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) establishing
a procedure by which the Securities and Exchange Commission
188. Switzerland-United States: Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually
Acceptable Means For Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field
of Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Memorandum]; Honegger,
Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illumination of the United States-Swiss
Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C.J. INT'L & CoM. REG. 1 (1983); Raifman, The Effect
of the U.S.-Swiss Agreement on Swiss Banking Secrecy and Insider Trading, 15 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 565 (1983); Rushford, The Effect of Swiss Bank Secrecy on the Enforce-
ment of Insider Trading Regulations and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the
United States and Switzerland, 7 BRIT. COLUM. INT'L & COMP. L REv 541 (1984); Note,
Insider Trading Laws and Swiss Banks: Recent Hope for Reconciliation, 22 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 303 (1984)(authored by John Hansen). Unlike a treaty, a memorandum of
understanding is not a binding agreement requiring the ratification by the United States
Senate and the Swiss Parliament.
189. Rushford, supra note 188, at 542 (citing T.S.C. Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976)); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
190. Rushford, supra note 188, at 542.
191. Id. at n.16.
192. Id. at 543 n.19.
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(SEC) could obtain assistance with insider trading investigations
that were not covered by the Swiss Treaty. " The proposed private
agreement among the members of the SBA was designed to deal
with requests from the SEC, and was attached to the Memoran-
dum. "4 The Memorandum and Agreement were temporary mea-
sures intended to address SEC requests prior to the enactment of a
Swiss penal law. This penal law was designed to subject securities
violations and insider trading per se to criminal prosecution. This
fulfilled the Swiss Treaty's mandate of dual criminality.'
As noted above, assistance under the Swiss Treaty is available
only for offenses that are crimes in both countries. Trading on the
basis of inside information was not a crime in Switzerland at the
time the Swiss Treaty was enacted, and is not provided for in the
Schedule of Offenses.196 In essence, a Swiss bank customer could
engage in insider trading with the assurance that the Swiss bank
secrecy laws would protect his or her identity.1" However, the
Memorandum lightened constraints on United States efforts to ob-
tain information regarded as confidential under Swiss law in three
major areas. First, the Memorandum addressed the issue of fraud.
The schedule of offenses defines fraud as a criminal offense,'"8 but
it was unclear whether a securities violation was considered fraud
under the Treaty. This created a problem because securities viola-
tions as characterized by United States law were not criminal of-
fenses under Swiss law."" The Memorandum resolved this di-
lemma by focusing on certain provisions of the Swiss Penal Code
which define "transactions effected by persons in possession of ma-
terial non-public information" to be crimes.200
The second problem addressed by the Memorandum con-
193. Id. at 561-62.
194. Raifman, supra note 188, at 600. This private agreement is known as Agreement
XVI of the Swiss Banker's Association with Regard to the Handling of Requests for Infor-
mation from the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States on the Subject
of Misuses of Inside Information, dated July 14, 1982, 22 I.L.M. 7 (1983) [hereinafter Agree-
ment]. This Agreement was limited in scope as to the availability and use of evidence that
was obtained through the private mechanism established between the SBA and the SEC.
195. Raifman, supra note 188, at 609. Rushford, supra, note 188, at 562. See Swiss
Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4.
196. Raifman, supra note 188, at 565; Rushford, supra note 188, at 555. Swiss Treaty,
supra note 3, at Schedule of Offenses.
197. Rushford, supra note 188, at 555.
198. Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, Schedule, section 19.
199. Rushford, supra note 188, at 562 n. 211 and accompanying text.
200. Id. at n.215 and accompanying text.
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cerned the distinction between the initiation of civil and criminal
suits.2 01 The Swiss Treaty applies to those offenses considered
crimes in both the United States and Switzerland, and those of-
fenses specifically listed in the Schedule of Offenses. Most suits in-
itiated by the SEC are either civil or administrative in nature, and
therefore fall between the cracks and escape the purview under the
Swiss Treaty.2 02 Article II(3)(a) of the Memorandum provides for
"mutual assistance in investigations or court proceedings in respect
[to] offenses the punishment of which falls or would fall within the
judicial authorities of the requesting state . . . ." This has been
interpreted to extend assistance under the Swiss Treaty, provided
the offense is one that "could be prosecuted in criminal courts."' 03
Therefore, where the SEC initiates an investigation into suspected
insider trading, the Memorandum allows access to the Swiss
Treaty because some securities violations may be referred to the
Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.2 04
The third area addressed by the Memorandum is the use of
information obtained under the Swiss Treaty.2 e0 Evidence obtained
pursuant to a request under the Swiss Treaty was limited to use in
criminal proceedings only. This created a problem when the SEC
initiated civil proceedings.2 06 Article II of the Memorandum states
that sometime in the future the United States and Switzerland
would, by means of a Diplomatic Exchange of Notes, allow evi-
dence obtained under the treaty to be utilized in proceedings "in
which sanctions and remedies are available other than prison
sentences and fines imposed in criminal prosecutions.""' 7 The Ex-
201. Id. at 563.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at n.219. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exhange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78)
and Rule 10b-5 of the Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (17
C.F.R. 240.10b-5) are the main provisions regulating insider trading in the United States
Section 16(b) requires insiders (an officer or director of a company that has a class of equity
securities registered under the 1934 act) to remit to their companies any profit made on the
purchase or sale of company stock made within a single six-month period. However, section
16(b) enforcement must be brought by the corporation or shareholder, and not the SEC.
Rule 10b-5 generally allows the SEC to adopt rules and regulations prohibiting the use of
"any manipulative or deceptive device" in connection with the purchase or sale of a secur-
ity. As stated, Swiss bank secrecy laws prohibit disclosure of any information about custom-
ers and their transactions including names, amounts, deposit and withdrawal activities,
therefore avoiding the reporting requirements of section 16(b) and the identity require-
ments of Rule 10b-5. Rushford, supra note 188, at 552-554.
205. Rushford, supra note 188, at 563.
206. Id. at 564. See Swiss Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 5.
207. Rushford, supra note 188, at 564.
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change of Notes was signed on November 10, 1987.08
The Exchange of Notes specifically refers to the Swiss Treaty
and in particular to Article 1, paragraph 3 which provides that as-
sistance under the Swiss Treaty will be given in certain ancillary
administrative proceedings against one who commits an offense
under the terms of the Swiss Treaty.09 The Exchange of Notes
clearly delineates to which ancillary administrative proceedings the
Swiss Treaty was referring, and further clarifies the above-men-
tioned problems regarding the passage of the Memorandum and
accompanying Agreement.
The Exchange of Notes states that if assistance under the
Swiss Treaty can be granted with a view towards possible criminal
action in the United States, then assistance will be extended to
investigations and proceedings initiated by the SEC that involve
insider trading offenses. 210 The Exchange of Notes stresses that the
Swiss Treaty provides "an important means of obtaining informa-
tion ...and should be used to the extent possible." 2" The Ex-
change of Notes concludes by focusing on possible future assis-
tance under the Swiss Treaty being granted, with a view towards
possible criminal proceedings in Switzerland, referring to the possi-
ble adoption of a general law under the Swiss Penal Code prohibit-
ing insider trading. With this in mind, the assistance will be
granted by competent Swiss authorities with respect to offenses
that involve insider trading and are likewise covered by the Swiss
208. Exchange of Notes between the United States and the Swiss Confederation, signed
Nov. 10, 1987, [hereinafter Notes] (unpublished) (available at offices of the University of
Miami Inter-American Law Review).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2. The Notes allow assistance in the following ancillary proceedings: (1) suits
in a court of the United States seeking permanent or preliminary injunctions or temporary
restraining orders; (2) suits in a court of the United States seeking other equitable relief
ancillary to the relief sought in paragraph (1) above, such as a freeze of assets or the dis-
gorgement of profits gained (or losses avoided) as a result of violative conduct; (3) suits in a
court of the United States seeking the imposition of a civil penalty or fine, provided how-
ever, that if evidence or information is obtained pursuant to a grant of assistance under the
Treaty, such evidence or information shall not be used to secure the imposition of a civil
penalty or fine to compel a person to act in a way that would be contrary to Swiss law; (4)
suits in a court of the United States for an order commanding a person to comply in the
future with provisions of the United States securities laws or the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder; and (5) enforcement proceedings conducted before the SEC or an
administrative law judge in which the revocation or suspension of the registration of a regu-
lated entity, or a suspension or bar of a person from being associated with such an entity, as
a result of violative conduct is sought. Id. at 2-3.
211. Id. at 3.
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Treaty.2 2
On May 1, 1985, Article 161 of the Swiss Penal Code was pro-
posed as the New Insider Bill.21 8 The insider must have knowledge
of confidential information in order to fall within Article 161.
"This information must be apt to influence in a foreseeable man-
ner and to a considerable degree the price of certain securities on a
stock market."21' The person must then use this information to ob-
tain a pecuniary gain for himself or a third party, including profits
or the avoidance of losses.2 5 Even if the anticipated price move-
ment fails to occur, the attempt qualifies as a punishable offense.2 1 6
The effects of Article 161 on United States-Swiss relations in
this area will be sweeping. Article 161 replaces the provisional
212. Id. at 3-4. The assistance will be conducted by the Swiss authorities and is limited
in scope. See id. at 3-4.
213. Article 161 Penal Code (new), known as the Swiss Insider Bill, was adopted by
both chambers of Parliament on December 18, 1987, and has become law. It reads as
follows:
Exploitation of Knowledge of Confidential Facts
1. A person who, in his capacity as a member of the board, an officer, an auditor,
or a mandated person of a company or a corporation dominating this company
or dominated by it, in his capacity as a member of a public authority or as a
public officer, or in his capacity as an assistant to such persons, knows a confi-
dential fact whose disclosure can be anticipated to have a significant influence
on the market price of the shares, other securities or equivalent negotiable in-
struments or interests of the company, or on the market price of options thereof,
traded on or ancillary to any Swiss stock exchange, and obtains thereby for him-
self or a third party a pecuniary advantage through the exploitation of this in-
formation, or discloses such a fact to any third party and obtains thereby for
himself or a third party a pecuniary advantage, shall be punished by imprison-
ment or by fine.
2. A person to whom such a fact is communicated directly or indirectly by any
person described in subsection 1, and who obtains for himself or a third party a
pecuniary advantage through the exploitation of this information, shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment for not over one year or by a fine.
3. A fact in the meaning of subsection 1 and 2 may be a pending emission of
new participatory rights, a merger or a similar set of circumstances of compara-
ble importance.
4. When it is envisaged to bring together two corporations, subsections 1 and 3
apply to both corporations.
5. Subsections 1 to 4 apply by analogy when the exploitation of the knowledge
of a confidential fact relates to shares, other securities or negotiable instruments
or interests, or options thereof, of a cooperative corporation or of a foreign
company.
Copy received courtesy of K. Hochner, Counselor for the Embassy of Switzerland (March
1988) (available in the offices of the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review).
214. Haymann, Swiss to Outlaw Insider Trading, INT'L BRIEFINGS (1987).
215. Id.
216. Id. See also Krauskopf, The New Insider Bill, printed by the Swiss Federal Office
of Justice, March 20, 1987.
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Agreement and Memorandum, because it authorizes requests for a
wide range of securities violations to be covered under the Swiss
Treaty.217 This includes insider trading in connection with impend-
ing mergers and tender offers, covering not only affiliates of the
corporations, but also their tippees. 18 Article 161 is not restricted
to the classic definition of insiders, but also includes accountants,
lawyers and investment bankers. 19
The most important implication of Article 161 is that it clearly
satisfies the dual criminality requirement of the Swiss Treaty.
Prior to this proposal no law dealing with insider trading existed in
Swiss history. Article 161 is broader in scope than both the Memo-
randum and the Agreement. It dispenses with most of the banking
industry procedures involved in obtaining confidentiality waivers
from Swiss bank customers.20 The Swiss Treaty removes any
doubts and hesitancy that may have been associated in applying
the Memorandum and Agreement, by confirming both countries'
willingness to prosecute securities violations involving the use of
inside information. 2 1 Furthermore, when the terms are clearly
met, the application of Article 161 to the Swiss Treaty overrides
any conflicting international arrangements. It establishes a bright-
line mechanism by which the United States and the Swiss authori-
ties can mutually prosecute suspected criminals. With the recent
Diplomatic Exchange of Notes, ancillary civil matters also can be
mutually prosecuted. Therefore, the full force of the Swiss Treaty
will be at the disposal of the United States prosecutorial authori-
ties, allowing a broader base from which to draw evidence and in-
formation needed in securities violations proceedings.
The foregoing was a brief glimpse at the complex problems of
United States prosecutorial efforts to obtain information involved
in securities violations and the conflicts created by Swiss bank se-
crecy principles. An overview is essential, however, to illustrate the
problems encountered when two countries with differing views on
major issues draft a mutual assistance treaty. Insider trading is a
major problem in the United States, and the stock exchanges are
becoming increasingly sensitive to any influx of foreign capital.
Therefore, where a foreign country such as Switzerland has no ap-







plicable legislation regulating and prohibiting insider trading, un-
scrupulous investors are shielded from United States prosecution.
The Exchange of Notes, along with Article 161, will redefine the
role of Swiss bank secrecy, international reliance on these secrecy
laws, and the ability of United States prosecutorial authorities to
stop securities violations abroad.
With respect to the Cayman Treaty, the comprehensive nature
of Article 19 section 3(g) gives the United States a free hand in the
investigation and prosecution of any insider trading falling within
the definition of Article 19.222 The Cayman Treaty limits civil and
administrative proceedings to matters involving narcotics traffick-
ing. 223 This limitation should be analyzed in light of the underly-
ing purposes in the creation of both the Cayman and the Swiss
Treaties.
The Swiss Treaty was the first international agreement aimed
at obtaining information needed for criminal prosecutions. 224 Com-
batting organized crime was the major force behind the creation of
the treaty.22 The Cayman Treaty seems focused on controlling the
flow of illegal proceeds from the United States to the Cayman Is-
lands, and it is this problem that Article 19 addresses.226 The
drafters of the Cayman Treaty had the foresight to create broad
definitional provisions, and leave themselves room to maneuver
222. Article 19(3)(h) provides:
Fraudulent securities practices, which means the use by any person willfully or
dishonestly of any means, directly or indirectly, in connection with the offer,
purchase or sale of any security- (i) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud; (ii) dishonestly to make any untrue statement of a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under
which it was made, not misleading; or (iii) dishonestly to engage in any act, prac-
tice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person.
The language in this subsection is identical to the language used in Rule lOb-5 promulgated
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a - 78kk.
223. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 1(1).
224. Ford, Letter of Transmittal, Feb. 18, 1976, reprinted in the Message From The
President Of The United States, U.S. Govevernment Printing Office, at III.
225. Ingersoll, Letter of Submittal, Feb. 5, 1976, reprinted in Message From The Presi-
dent Of The United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, Feb. 18, 1976, at vi; Swiss
Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 6, 7, 8.
226. In the past ten years, the influx of foreign investors into the United States market
has accentuated the problems associated with securities transactions. The problems also
have been heightened by the lack of regulation in most foreign countries. Specifically, al-
though the Cayman Islands have a vast number of banks, they are not involved in billion
dollar transactions on the United States stock markets. Therefore, the resourcefulness of the
insider trading provision (non-civil use) is relatively insignificant.
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when problems develop. In contrast, the Swiss Treaty is so limited
in scope that years of legal proceedings and political efforts to clar-
ify its applicability to United States discovery proceedings have
been a nightmare.
V. CONCLUSION
A mutual legal assistance treaty, while having the ability to be a
mighty international legal tool, can also prove to be frustrating and
ineffective if not meticulously drafted with an eye towards future
needs. In the sixteen years since the Swiss Treaty, the United
States has gained valuable knowledge and expertise in negotiating
and drafting such treaties. This newly acquired knowledge is
clearly evidenced in the Cayman Islands Treaty. This treaty was
carefully drafted to aid United States prosecutors in their pursuit
of drug smugglers and security defrauders who flee to the Caymans
with their purloined funds and records. It seems apparent that this
treaty was brought into existence because of United States impa-
tience with Cayman secrecy laws and its noncompliance with
United States subpeonas. The Islands treaty does not seem to con-
template a situation where the Caymans would be the requesting
party rather than the requested party. The treaty may appear mu-
tual on its face by the use of neutral terms, yet one must wonder
what brought the Cayman government to the negotiating table.
One may cite the mutual desire to halt criminals or the desire of
the Cayman government to purge itself of the tax haven stigma.
Regardless of its motivation, the Cayman government has signed a
treaty that saves the United States many steps in its trek to catch
wrongdoers who flee its jurisdiction. Considering the United States
need for such a treaty, there is no doubt in the authors' minds that
this treaty will be hurried into effect. The Cayman Treaty "...




227. Cayman Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 20.
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